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ABSTRACT The convergence of legacy power system components with advanced networking and
communication facilities have led towards the development of smart grids. Smart grids are envisioned to
be the next generation innovative power systems, guaranteeing resilience, reliability and sustainability and
to facilitate energy production, distribution and management. Nonetheless, the development of such systems
entails challenges covering a broad spectrum ranging from operational management up to data-driven power
accounting and network security. Given the highly distributed properties of the modern grid, energy theft can
now be observed at various transmission and distribution levels. Apart from the financial gain for a malicious
actor, energy theft can also affect critical grid processes with a direct impact on its overall resilience and
safety. This survey reviews recent energy theft strategies as well as detection methods from a data-driven
perspective. By considering various operational and functional layers within modern smart grids we critically
assess how energy theft can be formulated. Moreover, we provide an overview of the grid demand, supply
and control chain with a focus on energy theft and associated security flaws that currently exist in the smart
grid ecosystem. Different attack detection models for theft detection in the smart grid are categorized. Lastly,
we discuss various open issues in the scope of data-driven energy theft detection methods and provide future
directions to carry out research in this field.
INDEX TERMS Energy theft, data-driven methods, smart grid, cybersecurity.
NOMENCLATURE
Abbreviation
T&D Transmission and distribution.
ACC Accuracy.
AMI Advanced metering infrastructure.
ANN Artificial neural network.
AUC Area under the curve.
BMS Building management system.
CNN Convolutional neural network.
DC Direct current.
DL Deep learning.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Alicia Fornés .
DR Demand response.
DRES Distributed renewable energy sources.
DSO Distribution system operator.
EMS Energy management system.
FDI False data injection.
FIT Feed in tariff.
FPR False positive rate.
GBM Gradient boosting machines.
GPS Global positioning system.
GRU Gated recurrent unit.
HAN Home area network.
HEMS Home energy management system.
HV High voltage.
ICS Industrial control system.
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IEA International energy agency.
IED Intelligent electronic device.
KNN K-nearest neighbors.
LAN Local area network.
LOF Local outlier factor.
LSTM Long short term memory.
LV Low voltage.
MITM Man in the middle.
MLP Multi layer perceptron.
MV Medium voltage.
NAN Neighbourhood area network.
OPF Optimum path forest.
PCA Principal component analysis.
PDC Phasor data concentrator.
PMU Phasor measurement unit.
RNN Recurrent neural network.
RTU Remote terminal unit.
SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition.
SVM Support vector machine.
TPR True positive rate.
TSO Transmission control operator.
WAMS Wide area measurement system.
WAN Wide area network.
Notation
α Theft coefficient on generation data.
β Theft coefficient on supply data.
γ Theft coefficient on demand data.
G T&D grid.
M Number of energy distribution buses.
N Number of total nodes.
P Number of prosumer nodes.
Q Number of consumer nodes.
S Number of grid supply nodes.
Ec Demand node energy consumption.
Er Prosumer node energy generation.
Es Energy supply by T&D control nodes.
NTL Cumulative non-technical energy loss.
TL Technical energy loss.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical attacks on power grids aiming explicitly at
energy theft are the most prominent and they have been
reported to cause significant financial as well as functional
losses to energy utility companies at a global scale. Hence,
energy theft attacks cause major concerns to both providers
and consumers. Irrespective of whether such attacks are
executed by a single consumer or at a large scale, losses
incurred to providers due to energy theft are undesirable
and enormous. As reported in [1], energy theft causes utility
companies to loose more than £19 billion yearly on a global
basis.
Several studies carried out in 2019 point that almost 80%
of 2000 UK residents were not aware that energy theft is
directly affecting them [2]. The reported studies also reveal
that due to energy theft, £20 are added yearly on average to
a household bill. Thus, millions of clients pay for energy
that they have never used and, most importantly, did not
steal. In general, each year in the UK alone, energy worth
£400 million is stolen leading to inflated customer bills [3].
In order to secure such energy and revenue losses, util-
ity companies typically conduct physical inspections in the
locations where energy theft is due to intensify [4]. Nonethe-
less, such conventional energy theft detection tracking is
time-consuming, inaccurate, costly, and labour-intensive [5].
Therefore, to deploy more effective theft countermeasures,
providers need to make use of the present electricity market
driven by the need to collect and analyze data. The facilitation
of data-driven operation drives utility providers to embed
smart metering equipment in various levels of the electricity
flow within smart grids [6]. The entire life cycle of gathering
energy data runs through smart grid infrastructures which are
categorized into electricity generation, transmission and dis-
tribution (T&D), and end-user infrastructure. This data col-
lection infrastructure leads to the emergence of an advanced
line of detection method driven by measurement-based data
providing opportunities to address energy theft. Data-driven
detection is able to reduce the risk of lateral attacks leading
to energy theft and recognize anomalous system behaviours
arising from such events. Thus, reduce revenue losses for
service utilities.
Although, a variety of data-driven detection methods have
been developed, malicious actors continue to discover inno-
vative strategies in an attempt to perpetrate energy thefts
across smart-grid infrastructures [7]. In this regard, the smart
grid data measurements and monitoring infrastructure can
pave theway formore approaches to fabricate next generation
data-driven theft attacks, thus increasing relative energy and
financial losses. McLaughlin et al. [8] and Jiang et al. [9]
review these data-driven theft attacks from the perspective
of power-system communication-layer architectures, based
on adversary strategies targeting the integrity of the power
system by manipulating power demand data. However, these
surveys were not focused on energy theft and do not consider
recent advances in modern smart grids, as the nature of vul-
nerabilities and threats related to energy theft are constantly
changing due to the increasing intersection of power grids
with Internet-enabled cyber-physical systems [10].
Motivated by these observations, we investigate and sur-
vey the advances in energy theft from different perspectives
within the smart grid ecosystem revolving around energy data
manipulation from all the three functions of demand, supply,
and generation. A variety of vulnerabilities enable adversaries
to exploit grid infrastructure components, communication
networks and managements systems with the intention of
gaining monetary benefit. Hence, in this survey we provide
an overview of different types of energy theft attacks in smart
grids. We audit the latest research on data-driven attacks
enabling energy theft and outline key findings. Moreover,
we also discuss the existing data-driven energy theft detection
schemes and summarise outstanding challenges. This work
serves as the first stop for general audiences as well as domain
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specialists looking for information and guidelines regarding
energy theft in present-day smart grid systems and markets.
We explicitly contribute in the wider research community for
modern energy grids by providing:
1) The first survey paper covering the largest spectrum of
data-driven attack strategies available in the literature
used for carrying out energy theft in the modern elec-
tricity market.
2) A novel energy theft categorization model from the
different smart-grid data flow perspectives.
3) A critical assessment of lessons learned from the appli-
cation of various data-driven approaches presently used
for detecting energy theft.
4) Recommendations for future research directions with
respect to the design of data-driven energy theft detec-
tion schemes as tailored with an extensive analysis of
open issues.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
section II focuses on the key infrastructures consisting the
modern power grids such as to relate attack vectors associ-
ated with energy theft. Section III provides a comprehensive
analysis on data-driven energy theft attacks. In section IV,
we categorize and discuss data-driven algorithms used in
energy theft detection systems. Section V presents the exist-
ing gaps in research for data-driven energy theft detec-
tion discussing open issues and recommends future research
directions. Finally, in SectionVI, we conclude and summarise
this paper.
II. SMART GRID COMPONENTS
Energy theft may span over multiple logical or physical
entities and can be instrumented via numerous attack vectors
affecting one or more of the systems consisting the modern
smart grid. Within this work, the various properties of energy
theft are discussed in terms of the intrinsic characteristics
of each of these infrastructures. Therefore this section is
dedicated at presenting an overview of the infrastructure of
the smart grid with its core components.
One of the main goals within the modern smart grid is to
ensure the optimal operation of the electricity supply chain.1
As shown in Fig. 1, the end-to-end energy supply chain is
decomposed into three distinct phases; i) generation, ii) trans-
mission and distribution (i.e. T&D) and, iii) end-user con-
sumption. All three phases are directly dependent on explicit
technologies, administrative domains and networked power
system infrastructures. Each of these entities pose unique
vulnerabilities that can enable energy theft [11], [12].
The energy generation phase is achieved within large,
centralised power stations that nowadays are interfaced with
power generation DRES deployments and are commonly
owned by the national transmission energy network con-
trolled by one or a set of transmission control operators
(TSOs). Each TSO is engaged through a competitive energy
1This paper is focused on energy delivered by electricity networks and not
gas.
trading market scheme with a number of distribution system
operators (DSOs) in order to supply them with electricity
to be distributed to end-consumers .2 DSOs may also have
a direct interface and own DRES deployments or they fre-
quently have an energy trading contract with end-consumers
or third-party DRES owners that contribute directly in the
energy generation phase.
In general, any control and management (sub)systems
alongside the electro-mechanical set of power systems
enabling data and energy flows spanning the energy sup-
ply chain are underpinned by diverse and ubiquitous data
communication technologies. Fig. 1, indicatively illustrates
a variety of potential networking technologies and deploy-
ment setups that could be employed in modern smart grids.
Similarly with the energy trading market, the business model
behind the ownership of these deployments depends on a
number of aspects related to country-level legislation and
policies [13] and it is out of the interest within this paper.
A. ENERGY GENERATION
1) CENTRALISED GENERATION
Energy generation systems can be categorised to operate
either in a centralised or a decentralised fashion. Centralised
generation systems produce large-scale electricity at power
stations, utilising fossil fuels and nuclear plants or renew-
able resources such as hydroelectric power plants, wind and
solar farms. These centralised systems are usually placed in
remote areas that are distant from the end users. and are
linked to distributed stations owned by a given DSO via a
network of HV transmission lines operated by a TSO [14].
The DSO stations are responsible for transmitting electric-
ity through the medium and low voltage grids to multiple
end-users [15].
2) DISTRIBUTED RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES (DRES)
DRES have evolved to act as an integral element of the
electricity generation infrastructure aiding the needs of
the backbone grid in terms of critical ancillary services
(e.g., frequency regulation, reactive power) enabling grid sta-
bilisation, diversifying energy trading and most importantly
matching the peak during overloaded periods [16]–[18].
Moreover, DRES deployments are currently considered as
the most suitable components for contributing towards the
reduction of global carbon emissions [17]. According to the
international energy agency (IEA), DRES deployments have
contributed to 40% of the total primary energy supply glob-
ally in 2020 [19].
Energy generation billing and trading for DRES is cur-
rently achieved via two distinct systems; i) net metering
and, ii) feed in tariffs (FIT). Net metering operates with
a single meter and employs a model where prosumers use
their own DRES-based generated power on-site and any
surplus is considered as a future credit on their billing
2In the USA a TSO may be referred to as an independent system opera-
tor (ISO) and a DSO as a regional transmission operator (RTO).
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FIGURE 1. Phases and components of the energy supply chain in the smart grid.
issued by their DSO. On the other hand, FIT operates based
on two smart meters residing at the prosumer end deal-
ing with the capturing of energy generation and consump-
tion rates independently. By contrast to net metering, FIT
decouples the monitoring process and facilitates a simpler
data processing framework for energy trading as well as
billing, thus it was extensively adopted in a number of devel-
oped countries such as the UK, Canada, Japan, China, and
Australia [20].
Despite of the various benefits offered by DRES
deployments, their direct dependency on natural resources
(e.g., wind, solar radiation) that are in some cases unpre-
dictable to fully forecast may cause challenges and higher
complexity within the overall grid optimisation process. Thus
increasing risks related to aspects of reliability, resilience
as well as safety [21], [22]. Nonetheless, a number of
approaches have been proposed to confront complexity con-
straints through ramp strategies [17]. In parallel, the integra-
tion of DRES involves diverse types of data communication
and system-on-chip technologies that are commonly manu-
factured with minimal security [23], [24]. Hence, enlarging
the spectrum of cyber attacks that could be initiated such as
to support potential energy theft acts [25].
B. ENERGY TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION (T&D)
1) T&D ENERGY FLOW
The T&D infrastructure is responsible for enabling the trans-
mission of power and further distribution of electricity to the
consumers. As depicted in Fig. 1, T&D infrastructures may
be categorised into the low voltage (LV), high voltage (HV)
and medium voltage (MV) power networks. Throughout the
years, the topology for these power networks has evolved
from an ordinary radial structure to interconnected or consis-
tent networks, which has guaranteed higher reliability, oper-
ational economy, and best equipment use [26]. Primarily, the
electricity produced by the centralized electricity generation
systems is transported to different distribution stations over
HV transmission lines, which is then supplied to the end-
users through the widespread transmission lines of MV and
LV networks. In parallel, modern T&D infrastructures also
distribute energy generated at DRES deployments through
MV-LV substations [26].
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FIGURE 2. Exemplar Smart Grid network architecture highlighting some of the main data communication standards.
2) T&D DATA COMMUNICATION
The data communication network underpinning the oper-
ations of T&D infrastructures commonly consists of two
types of networked deployments that interact with the end-
consumer home area network (HAN). As demonstrated in
Fig. 2, end-to-end data communication between the T&D
infrastructure and a HAN is achieved via a wide area net-
work (WAN) interacting with a set of neighbourhood area
networks (NANs).
A WAN typically represents the aggregation of NANs and
it is mapped at the scale of a city-wide network considering
data flows related to energy distributed by multiple micro-
grids where each micro-grid is linked with a particular NAN.
In real deployments, the structure of a WAN is quite diverse
since it may consist of multiple networking technologies with
varying physical, logical and software components dealing
with network control and management [27], [28]. On the
other hand, NANs can be considered as a subset of a WAN
since they support smaller geographical regions and they act
as proxies of a given WAN for functions related to connec-
tivity and data aggregation of HANs with the main WAN.
In general, a WAN or a set of WANs alongside related NANs
and HANs are not necessarily always owned by correspond-
ing TSOs or DSOs as they could be managed and main-
tained by third-party network providers (e.g., Internet Service
Providers) or community entities (e.g., municipality).
3) DATA ACQUISITION & MANAGEMENT
The actual interface of data communication with data-driven
control and management of the processes explicit to reliable
and resilience distribution of energy is achieved via network-
enabled cyber-physical systems such as supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems are
nowadays the most frequently used systems within modern
T&D infrastructures. SCADA systems provide native inte-
gration of data communication technologies and system com-
ponents such as remote terminal units (RTUs) and intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) [29], [30]. The data communication
reliability offered by SCADA systems enables TSO/DSO
control centres to develop close to real-time state estimation
algorithms in order to optimise the grid’s performance and
increase situation-awareness [31], [32].
A relatively recent alternative approach to SCADA are
wide area measurement systems (WAMS) [33]. WAMS are
embedded with new data acquisition technologies facili-
tating synchronised measurements between remote T&D
deployments (e.g, micro-grids, substations) and facilitate the
basis for monitoring, operation and control [34]. In practise,
WAMS may be decomposed by a set of distributed Pha-
sor measurement units (PMUs) and phasor data concentra-
tors (PDCs) that sample data related to the waveform and the
analog voltage of remote sites through a global positioning
system (GPS) clock [33], [35].
C. END-USER INFRASTRUCTURE
1) ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE (AMI)
AMIs are considered one of the fundamental components
within the smart functionalities of the modern energy grid.
The operation of such infrastructures achieves end-to-end
metering in order to support the billing and trading processes
between an end-consumer or prosumer and a DSO/TSO.
A core innovation behind AMIs lies with the integration
of smart meters within residential households or business
buildings. In most developed and many of the developing
countries, smart meters have replaced the traditional mechan-
ical and analoguemeters and they enable a variety of services.
Apart from the real-time logging of measurements related
to end-user energy consumption (i.e. demand data), smart
VOLUME 9, 2021 5
A. Althobaiti et al.: Energy Theft in Smart Grids: Survey on Data-Driven Attack Strategies
meters also assess other features such as voltage levels as well
as real-time monitoring [36].
As already mentioned, data captured by smart meters
contribute to the overall demand response (DR) model and
they are transmitted through low-powered communication
and automation protocols (e.g., ZigBee, Z-Wave) in synergy
with upper layer application protocols (e.g., HTTP/HTTPS)
supported by their corresponding HAN. Fig. 2 provides an
exemplar illustration in which smart meter measurements are
locally aggregated within a HAN and are further distributed
to the corresponding T&D infrastructure through an adja-
cent NAN interacting with a WAN. The sampling rate for
measurements gathered by individual smart meters falls with
a pre-defined schedule agreed between the end-consumer
or prosumer with its corresponding DSO. Normally, mea-
surements are agreed to be sent in 5, 15, 30, or 60 minute
intervals [36]–[39].
2) ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EMS)
The adequate management and reactive control of energy
usage and production in end-user deployments is achieved
through the installation of EMS instances. Such instances
may be directly interfacing with a given DSO or through
proxy third-party stakeholders maintaining and supporting
large-scale EMS deployments. From the end-user perspec-
tive, there is a variety of EMS types coming with specific
functionalities such as home energy management sys-
tems (HEMSs) and building management systems (BMSs).3
In parallel, EMS can also be present at a larger scale deployed
either at a centralised or a distributed topology aggregat-
ing measurements for the T&D insfrastructure [40]–[42].
Nonetheless, the main role of an EMS instance at the end-user
infrastructure is to optimise energy consumption for an indi-
vidual or a set of individuals through controlling the various
appliances residingwithin a given building or household [43].
Hence, EMS software instances are usually composed of a
controller instructed by advanced energy optimisation algo-
rithmic components coupled with rule-based control func-
tions orchestrating the operations of appliances [6], [44].
D. GRID EFFECTIVENESS PILLARS
The effectiveness of the grid in all levels depends on the per-
formance of both quantitative as well as qualitative indicators.
For instance, the reliable operation of the energy grid directly
affects the well-being and safety of consumers whereas well-
being is not a fully quantifiable parameter and, in parallel,
grid reliability depends on quantifiable performance metrics
(e.g., demand-supply rate) [45]. Moreover, cyber-physical
challenges, such as attacks enabling energy theft may affect
directly grid optimisation processes, thus impacting grid reli-
ability with a cascading impact over user safety since some
power system machinery could be affected and malfunction-
ing [46], [47]. The latter example has a number of parameters
that are not necessarily quantifiable (e.g., grid security level,
3Discussion of EMS variations is out of scope for this paper.
safety impact on consumers/prosumers), hence a holistic cor-
relation scheme between the aforementioned pillars is an
extremely challenging task.
As evidenced in Fig. 3 this work relates grid effective-
ness with the three broad domains of reliability, resilience
and safety that we refer to as pillars. We exploit defini-
tions developed throughout the years and summarise the
definitions of the three inter-related pillars in order to struc-
turally assess the energy theft impact in the overall grid
effectiveness [47]–[49]:
1) Grid Reliability: preservation of continuous energy
supply to end consumers.
2) Grid Resilience: preservation of continuous energy
supply to end users with an acceptable level of energy
quality while under stress or faults.
3) User Safety: ensure that an individual or a group of
individuals utilising or maintaining the grid and its
services are not physically affected.
FIGURE 3. Grid effectiveness pillars.
This survey acknowledges that the highlighted pillars are
considered widely as independent research domains them-
selves. Hence, deeper investigation on the structure and prop-
erties of these pillars is out of the context within this paper.
III. ENERGY THEFT
Energy theft can be broadly defined as the case where indi-
viduals do not pay their electricity bills or they are paying
less than they should due to their meter being tampered
or bypassed. Attack vectors underpinning energy theft span
numerous vulnerability domains due to the emergence of a
plethora of smart grid applications (e.g., energy trading) that
rely on inherently vulnerable networked environments as a
result of the convergence of diverse legacy power systems
with Internet technologies (e.g., ICS deployments, meter-
ing). In general, energy theft can be instrumented through
a variety of techniques exploiting both physical as well as
data or communication-oriented properties of the current grid
[4], [50], [51]. Hence, the adequate categorisation of energy
theft types is a highly challenging task.
In order to address the aforementioned challenge and
appropriately structure the focus within this work, we identify
two distinct classes of energy theft:
1) Data-agnostic energy theft: the act of physical tamper-
ing of power components through techniques such as
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obstruction and bypass of electro-mechanical meters,
cable hooking as well as modification of meter
circuitry.
2) Data-driven energy theft: the act of manipulating and
altering communication and/or consumption-related
data generated and/or logged at any networked meter-
ing (e.g., smart-meter), management (e.g., SCADA
system) and control device (e.g., PLC) as well as billing
software (e.g., utility mobile apps) aiming at reporting
false consumption information to the power distribu-
tion authority (e.g., a DSO).
Both classes target either of the bidirectional energy
or data flow between different grid aggregation points
(e.g., T&D, end-user, generation) and they have seen a con-
siderable level of attention from the research community as
well as the society in general [12], [20]. Moreover, both types
have shown to be applicable in all three levels of aggregation
within a smart grid. Hence, energy theft can be deployed in
the power generation infrastructure, the T&D network as well
as the end-consumer level.
This work argues that the main concept of a given data-
driven theft attack can be abstracted by a discrete func-
tion in which inter-dependent variables are tailored based
on the targeted infrastructures composing a complete smart
grid deployment. Hence, the function may vary depending
on the variable-specific adjustments conducted by a mali-
cious actor based on the intrinsic properties of a given
smart grid (sub)infrastructure (e.g., communication, power).
Commonly, malicious actors attempt to target a set of diverse
vulnerabilities of both system and network components from
all three infrastructures described herein. Evidently, data-
driven energy theft in all three infrastructures has consider-
ably increased due to the data-oriented functioning of the
business layer as envisaged in the current smart grid reference
architectures (e.g., SGAM [52]).
A. TECHNICAL IMPACT OF ENERGY THEFT
Energy theft is underpinned by a large spectrum of
cyber-physical attacks that span a number of organisation
(e.g., physical security) as well as technology-oriented vul-
nerabilities (e.g., legacy ICS security). The current ubiquity
offered by the bidirectional flow of energy and data in the
current smart grid, alongside the highly distributed nature of
various components (e.g., DRES) enable the composition of
energy theft-related attempts.
In the year 2012, a German renewable power utility was
targeted with the denial of service (DoS) attack when thou-
sands of requests were sent to its server to block its oper-
ation [53]. This attack knocked off the Internet connection
of the utility for five consecutive days. Such a scenario
can serve as an opportunity for the malicious entities to
orchestrate an energy theft without being detected causing
major losses to the utility. More recently, there have been
unconfirmed attempts on national grid infrastructure of the
United States and United Kingdom wherein the potential
hackers tried to break into the utility’s network to disrupt their
services [54], [55]. These attacks, if successful, have the
potential to affect grid effectiveness by hampering the busi-
ness model of the grid and can also lead to the infrastruc-
ture failure. Following such events, the US and UK security
services issued warnings to the providers to raise the cyber-
security standards in order to mitigate such attacks which
have increased manifolds.
Cyber attacks on power grids were, and still are in the
majority, instrumented with the intent to manipulate data
flows of the various grid resources and/or services. A number
of data-driven cyber attacks (e.g., as in [56], [57]) caused
catastrophic faults on system components leading vital grid
optimisation processes to malfunction. Thus, causing a decay
on the overall grid effectiveness. For instance, the infamous
cyber-attack in Ukraine’s T&D infrastructure resulted in
power outages that have affected around 225, 000 consumers
for several hours [56]. Another similar attack in 2019 targeted
the major electricity supplier in South Africa’s Johannesburg
which caused major disruption in the electricity supply for
some resident areas leaving thesewithout electricity [58]. The
attackers used ransomware to encrypt the files and computer
systems of the utility, which affected the ability of the cus-
tomers to buy pre-paid electrical energy and later hindered
with the response towards localised blackouts.
All of these attacks target for grid/service failure which in
turn hampers the grid infrastructure by causing temporary or
permanent damage to the grid assets. These attacks primarily
exploited the open and existing network vulnerabilities to
target the electrical infrastructure in the power sector. The
scale of these attacks will only increase with time (more
so where all the entities are connected over the Internet),
however, using the data-driven techniques, these attacks can
be mitigated to a great extent.
B. ENERGY THEFT MODEL
Energy theft in the context of the smart grid can be abstracted
using various generalised approaches. We indicate ways in
which data-driven energy theft can be modeled from the per-
spective of manipulating generation, supply and demand data
respectively. The proposed approaches rely on the notation
denoted in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Energy theft model notation.
As depicted in Fig. 4, we consider a grid G in a NAN to
be defined by a set of N connected nodes and M connecting
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FIGURE 4. Energy grid model consisting of supply and demand nodes.
energy buses. A node is indicated as a prosumer node if it has
a local DRES; otherwise, the node is indicated as a demand
node.
Let TLj(t) denote technical energy losses caused by wires
and equipment resistance under the normal, theft-free con-
dition in the jth bus, where j ∈ M . We also consider the
















The first two terms in equation 1 denote the total energy
supplied via i ∈ S T&D supply nodes in G and the total
energy generated by k ∈ P prosumer nodes whereP ⊂ S. The
latter two terms are effectively subtracted by the former two
since they refer to total energy consumed by h ∈ Q consumer
nodes where Q ⊂ N and the aggregation of technical losses
caused by energy transmission over j ∈ M buses respectively.
The range of values for the final term in equation 1 is normally
between 5% and 8% of the transmitted energy from the T&D
infrastructure [4], [59].
1) GENERATION DATA-ORIENTED THEFT
We consider that various data manipulation attacks may
be conducted on DRES generation data [60] and [10] and
two-metering end-user deployments [20] on the prosumer
site. Alongside the inability to accurately predict weather
fluctuations affecting energy generation, we abstract the total
electrical energy injected to the power grid by the k ∈ P





where αk (t) is the theft coefficient for each supply node and
two outcomes for this coefficient are possible being:{
αk (t) > 1, malicious prosumers
αk (t) = 1, honest prosumers
Each supply node k ∈ P has a theft coefficient α at time t .
In the legitimate case where no attack is present, the theft
coefficient αk (t) equals 1; meaning that there are no dis-
crepancies in the DRES generation measurement at node k ,
since Erk (t) = αkErk (t). However, in the generation data-
oriented theft scenarios, the DRES generation measurements
entailed within Erk (t) are scaled by an attacker based on
an arbitrarily selected percentage, represented by αk (t). For
instance, the attacker in such a scenario may report 200% of
the actual measurements when αk (t) = 2. Hence, we abstract
malicious prosumers that report falsified metering for their
DRES generation process. Consequently, the non-technical
energy loss, NTL, will be greater than that for the normal case
(i.e. equation 1); since
∑P
k=1 αkErk (t) >
∑P
k=1 Er i(t).
2) SUPPLY DATA-ORIENTED THEFT
Let assume the generalised direct current (DC) model
described in [61], [62] such as the energy supply in our grid














are the state variables composed of
the voltages phase angles within a Jacobian matrix J and∑S
i=1 ei(t) is the measurement error from supply nodes
assumed to adhere to Gaussian noise e.
In data-driven energy theft, malicious actors normally
manipulate a subset of measurement data to alter metering.
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Hence, the aggregation of energy supply Es from all supply










where βi(t) is a vector representing maliciously injected data
within the legitimate measurements captured by a given T&D
control center. Essentially, βi(t) can be mapped as a False
Data Injection (FDI) attack instrumented at various levels
(e.g., communication protocol, metering protocol etc.).
3) DEMAND DATA-ORIENTED THEFT
Consumers or prosumers are also capable to lie on their
demand data by utilising FDI techniques to cause under
or over-reporting of energy consumption [23], [63]–[66].
We denote as γi(t) to be the theft coefficient of node i at time t
and O to be the set of consumers or prosumers providing
falsified demand request data, whereO = P∩Q. Considering
a demand data-oriented theft the non-technical loss NTL can










i=1 Eci(t). Hence, the
two possibilities for γi(t) would be:{
0 ≤ γi(t) < 1, malicious consumer/prosumer
γi(t) = 1, honest consumer/prosumer
In more detail, each consumer/prosumer i ∈ O has a
theft coefficient γ at time t . In the legitimate case assum-
ing no attack enabling energy theft, there are no discrepan-
cies in the demand measurements denoted by Eci(t), since
the relative theft coefficients γi(t) = 1 and Eci(t) =
γi(t)Eci(t). However, in the demand data-oriented theft, the
attacker manipulates the demand measurement signal Eci
at time t by enforcing an arbitrarily selected percentage
entailed within γi(t). Therefore, the attacker under reports
demand measurements and just reports a small portion of
measurements on a regular basis. For instance, an attacker
could potentially report 50% of the actual demand data, when
γ = 0.5.
C. ENERGY THEFT STRATEGIES
Data-driven energy theft is orchestrated either through tar-
geted or random methods [17], [68]. Targeted energy theft
refers to instances where a malicious actor has full awareness
of the vulnerability spectrum for a given system consisting of
a set of nodes (e.g., DRES deployment) and purposely injects
data such as to compromise its operation. Random methods
usually refer to scenarios where a malicious actor disturbs the
operation of individual nodes (e.g., a single DRES) by ran-
domly flooding the application protocol dealing with meter-
ing data or by injecting corrupted measurement values while
a node communicates with a centralised monitoring com-
ponent (e.g., a SCADA system). In general, energy theft
triggered by random methods is detected with higher
precision [69].
Both targeted or random methods for energy theft may be
triggered by a number of cyber-physical attack techniques.
The most common technique employed in the context of
energy theft is the combination of man in the middle (MITM)
with false data injection (FDI) [70]. These attempts refer to
cases where an individual with malicious intent intercepts
and redirects communication traffic between a smart meter
and an energy monitoring entity (e.g., SCADA instance in
a NAN) to its own hardware. Traffic is redirected to the
malicious actor such as to modify legitimate measurements
and further inject falsifying metering information and re-
transmit it to the monitoring component in order to affect
the energy billing process. Regardless of the attack scenario
underpinning energy theft, there are always some necessary
steps to be undertaken by a malicious actor. Fig. 5 briefly
provides some core steps that are frequently practised.
We highlight four steps that in many cases are used con-
currently in a given attack; i) reconnaissance, ii) scanning,
iii) exploitation, and iv) access. Hence, there exists a num-
ber of variations of how the aforementioned synergistic use
of MITM and FDI can be instrumented [57], [70], [71].
For instance, malicious actors could intercept general traffic
at specific data recording entities (e.g., microgrid backend
server) that they were aware of due to either scanning or
reconnaissance such as to jeopardise the final data writing
process with crafted, falsifiedmeasurements [8]. Other exam-
ples, include a combination of physical tampering ofmeters at
various power grid levels (e.g., T&D, end-user smart-meters)
where an attacker could identify through simple social engi-
neering and bypassing of authentication protocols through
ANSI optical ports with software such as Terminator that
enables access [20]. In parallel, sophisticated MITM and FDI
techniques may also consider the overall topology of a given
grid deployment [72] in order to bypass any detection mech-
anisms whereas other utilise adversarial machine learning in
order to game optimisation, scheduling and control processes
within the EMS [17], [23]. The aforementioned technique
is relatively new and exploits the deficiencies of automated
management functions by manipulating and crafting falsified
training data to machine learning-based processes that profile
several measurements (e.g., ramp rate, power factor, reactive
power) [23].
Given the diversity of the cyber-physical attack vectors
enabling energy theft [12], [24], this work organises the
various attack strategies based on their instrumentation and
further impact in Table 2. As depicted, there has been a
large volume in literature identifying, studying and further
demonstrating that such attacks can be initiated at various
aggregation levels by utilising different types of resources
(e.g., SCADA, PV panels). Interestingly different types of
attacks affect explicit grid efficiency pillars that we intro-
duced in Section II.
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FIGURE 5. Steps and associated activities in cyber-physical attacks enabling energy theft.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN DETECTION METHODS
As briefly discussed in Section III, energy theft can be data-
agnostic and resulted purely from physical tampering of
various grid components, or data-driven via manipulating,
destroying or corrupting software processes with the goal
to modify any data related to energy demand, generation or
consumption. Throughout the years, both the industry and
the research community have developed and employed tech-
niques in aiming to detect any energy theft-related activities.
In general, energy theft detection methods are structured
under two main categories; i) hardware-based detection and
ii) data-driven detection. Since the focus of this work is on the
data-driven aspects of energy theft, only the latter category is
discussed in this section.
Generally, the data-driven energy theft detection is
achieved through the algorithmic solution composition focus-
ing on deviations of data related to aspects such as metering
and billing. Hence, such detection schemes place a strong
emphasis on analysing data patterns through a variety of
statistical tools and the majority utilises machine learning
techniques. As depicted in Fig. 6, this work stratifies and
discusses data-driven energy theft detection with respect to
three main categories; i) classification-based, ii) regression-
based and, iii) clustering-based detection.
Given the diversity of theft scenarios and associated attack
vectors over different data aggregation levels on the smart
grid infrastructure, detection methods have been employed
either at a centralised or a distributed fashion. Table 3 pro-
vides a comprehensive summary of methods introduced in
past literature over the last decade. Evidently, the major-
ity of methods consider a combinatorial use of algorith-
mic techniques in order to address specific challenges rang-
ing from data pre-processing and filtering up to statistical
FIGURE 6. Data-driven energy theft detection categories.
correlation analysis. Furthermore, some formulations are
broadly used (e.g., artificial neural networks -ANNs and sup-
port vector machines - SVMs) over different types of attacks
operating under diverse data types gathered at various smart
grid data aggregation components.
Complementary, Table 4 illustrates the experimental
approach underpinning the methods summarised in Table 3
and further provides their outcomes. As depicted, each
method was employed over energy theft use cases involving
a number of nodes within the actual grid and utilised specific
statistical features. In summary, we identify a range of raw
as well as post-processing features that are utilised within the
listed methods. Thus, there exist techniques involving one or
more of basic statistical features (e.g., mean, min/max), fre-
quency and temporal domain features (e.g., signal periodicity
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TABLE 2. Overview of the data-driven energy theft attacks.
frequency components), scaling on independently distributed
raw data, clustering or probability-based similarity metrics
as well as locality (e.g, geolocation coordinates), auxiliary
(e.g., number of energy appliances) and environmental fea-
tures (e.g., temperature, humidity).
1) CLASSIFICATION-BASED DETECTION
Messinis et al. [80] proposed a classification system to detect
energy theft conducted at the end-user infrastructure. The
introduced solution was assessed over simulations replaying
the Irish Smart Energy Trail dataset and its operation relied
on the synergistic use of an SVM classifier, a power opti-
mization scheme and a voltage sensitivity analysis compo-
nent. In practise, the SVM classifier was producing a weight
function based on the annual active energy consumption for a
consumer that was expressed as the probability for committed
fraud. The proposed system achieved a high accuracy of
99.4%. However, this system required the utilization of addi-
tional features such as voltage and active energy data to detect
theft. The problem with utilizing such sensitive measures
is that it can expose customer data to privacy violations.
Moreover, features associated to real-time ancillary ser-
vices (e.g., active/reactive energy require adequate signal
smoothing techniques for complete conversion over the time-
frequency domain; an element missing from this piece of
work as it is not encapsulated within SVM formulations or
the proposed pre-processing stage. Thus, we argue that such
methods may not be generic enough.
A synergistic use of SVMs and decision trees for
theft detection in end-user infrastructure was proposed by
Jindal et al. [4]. Decision-tree formulation operates on vari-
ous features, including the numbers of heavy appliances and
persons, to generate the predicted consumption of each con-
sumer. Then, an SVM-based classifier is used to detect mali-
cious consumers. Results show that the proposed method can
be implemented in real-time scenarios as the false positive
rate is significantly reduced to 5.12%. A similar combination
was adopted by Althobaiti et al. in [10] to detect malicious
prosumers in generation infrastructure. To rigorously analyze
DRES generation data, an XGBoost and SVM were com-
bined for the proposed method. An XGBoost algorithm was
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TABLE 3. Overview of the data-driven energy theft detection methods.
run on freely available weather data and used to calculate the
energy generated by the DRES, and SVM was used for mea-
surement classification. The results show improved accuracy
of 98% for theft detection. However, applying the proposed
methods to a large-scale theft detection process remains lim-
ited due to the computational complexity resulting from the
synergistic use of multiple data-driven algorithms in such
detection methods.
Variations of the conventional SVM formulation in synergy
with principal component analysis (PCA) was also the basis
behind the work of Esmalifalak et al. in [62]. The evaluation
of SVM-based formulations was based on labelling load data
that were simulated as stochastic processes such as to comply
with pragmatic power system behaviour in the T&D system
infrastructure. PCA was initially employed in order to reduce
the high dimensionality of the simulated measurements and
they were firstly labelled within the training process of a
supervised SVM formulation. Subsequently, newly generated
measurements were tested over the supervised model and the
identification of outliers implying theft detection was feasible
with 95% accuracy. However, due to the dependence of the
proposed scheme on PCA, there exists a high likelihood of a
trade-off between the loss of important information included
in the simulated measurements and the dimensionality reduc-
tion process.
Recent developments in the area of deep learning (DL)
enabled the composition of adequate energy theft detection
schemes. Yao et al. in [1] demonstrated a novel synergy of
convolutional neural networks (CNN) and the Paillier cryp-
tosystem in order to maintain user privacy but also detect
energy theft. Under a similar mindset, a modified wide and
deep CNN was proposed in [81] in which the wide compo-
nent of the customised CNN deals with global consumption
features whereas the deep CNN component wasmore focused
on profiling the consumer’s consumption periodicity such as
to detect deviations implying energy theft at end-user level.
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TABLE 4. Experimental approaches of surveyed studies on data-driven energy theft detection.
The superiority of DL-based energy theft detectors was also
illustrated at the work in [82] where a number of traditional
and ensemble classifiers such as random forests, and gradient
boostingmachines (GBM)were comparedwith a CNN-based
classifier using T&D infrastructure measurements. Similarly,
the work by Ismail et al. in [20] demonstrates the applicability
of a DL-based detection solution based on measurements
that are captured at DRES deployments. However, such theft
detection methods entail enormous computational costs due
to the large amount of data required to effectively train fully
supervised DL-based detectors.
Several studies have also provided insightful compar-
isons of various classification-based energy theft detection
schemes and insights on the performance of particular sta-
tistical features. For instance, the work by Fernandes et al.
in [83] introduces the use of a customised optimum path
forest (OPF)-based detection scheme for attacks that tar-
get explicitly energy theft. In evaluations of industrial and
end-user consumption data the proposed scheme outper-
formed conventional classifiers such as SVM and Bayesian
classifiers with respect to detection accuracy. However,
with respect to log loss function, SVM achieved the best
value, outperforming the customised OPF-based detection
scheme.
Meira et al. in [84], examine a diverse set of spatiotem-
poral and exogenous features based on four criteria, namely,
auxiliary, similarity, locality and temporal. The performance
of the selected features was investigated through the classifi-
cation processes of customised SVM, logistic regression and
random forest formulations. It was clearly revealed that fea-
tures derived only from consumption measurements (such as
similarity features) are adequate for the accurate detection of
energy theft attacks. However, such a detection study entails
computational processes on further features from historical
consumption measurements, which limits the application of
this method in large-scale detection scenarios.
In parallel, the study by Glauner et al. in [85] demon-
strates that the classification process under various algorithms
(e.g., SVMs) reveals that features related to aggregated neigh-
bourhood consumption alongside locality parameters outper-
formed individual meter time series distributions. However,
we argue that energy theft detection based on the utilization of
features related to neighbourhood consumption and locality
parameters may not be generic enough, due to the fact that
the consumption patterns of those who belong to the same
geographical domain differ from one another.
The assessment of features pointing to energy theft in
synergy with classification performance were also one of the
main focus areas in the studies conducted in [7], [86] and [67].
Through the application and comparison of classification-
based ensemble methods (e.g., XGBoost, CatBoost, Light-
GBM) with conventional classifiers (e.g., ANNs, SVMs)
over simulated attack scenarios it was revealed that ensemble
methods contribute significantly towards computationally-
efficient and more accurate theft detection. However,
ensemble-based detection methods pose some instability
since a slight variation in the training data would unavoid-
ably entail substantial restructuring of the main tree-based
detection model. Thus, imposing higher computational costs.
Nonetheless, the work by Ashrafuzzaman et al. in [82]
demonstrates the superiority of deep learning-based theft
detection schemes over any ensemble-based approaches com-
pared, where the detection accuracy based on the deep learn-
ing technique was 97.7%.
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Despite the relatively high accuracy performance and relia-
bility of classification-based techniques, the aforementioned
detection methods require labelled data from malicious and
energy theft-free behaviours. Obtaining such data is either
challenging in a real scenario or, even if they exist, they do
not cover all possible theft-attack behaviours [93]. Theft-
free data can be collected from historical grid measurements,
however, malicious data (i.e., theft samples) covering the
spectrum of theft behaviours for a particular node hardly
exist. In such cases, the performance of the detection method
is limited due tomalicious sample unavailability. Thesemeth-
ods may remain unsuccessful in detecting more advanced and
stealthy attacks that are not available in training data, which
directly affects the overall detection performance [94].
2) REGRESSION-BASED DETECTION
M. Li et al. [87] proposed a modular energy theft detection
system consisting of a three-stage decision making process
achieving 99.96% on theft detection accuracy. The first stage
relies on a multi-model power consumption prediction sys-
tem based on Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP) ANN, Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) ANN, Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN) and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU). The second
stage deals with monitoring a moving average whereas the
third stage employs a customer’s historical measurements to
determine occasional maximum energy consumption in order
tomake a final decision on a theft attack. Although interesting
results are achieved, the proposed method is undynamic for
any future changes in consumption patterns, since the main
focus of such a system is the utilization of historical consump-
tion measurements in the detection process.
The behavioral profile of normal energy consumption was
assessed by Cody et al. [88] in order to detect deviations
implying energy theft. The conducted experiments revealed
that consumption values can be predicted using decision tree
learning and they can be categorised into normal or fraudulent
based on the threshold root mean squared error value. Any
value exceeding this threshold indicates a possible energy
theft attack. However, the prediction formulation proposed in
this study can be improved through the utilization of further
comprehensive features, such as numbers of appliances and
providing the prediction model with additional details to
determine consumers’ energy consumption patterns.
Complementary work in [89] achieves regression based on
random forests to predict the expected energy consumption
over theUS-wide consumption profiles for 2014. Through the
use of various performance metrics (e.g., prediction accuracy,
classification error rate) forecasting through random forests
achieved 95.78% of prediction accuracy and outperformed
a decision tree-based approach that reached 91.6% accu-
racy. Thus, providing a quite effective energy theft prediction
scheme. However, such a scheme cannot be considered as
generic since energy consumption is usually characterized
by invariable variance or non-stationary behaviour. There-
fore, the fundamental principles underpinning random forests
model could become inappropriate for identifying short-term
irregularities in energy consumption.
A data-driven regression model was proposed by
Y, Gao et al. [65] for energy theft detection. Instead of
using unreliable topology information and parameters from
secondary network, this method was based on modified
linear regression algorithm. It uses only the voltage data
and consumer’s consumption data making it more feasible
to adopt. Finally, the training data from real world smart
meter was used to validate proposed method and results
illustrate effective identification of cases related to energy
theft. However, customers’ data may be vulnerable to privacy
breaches due to the dependence upon voltage measurements.
Overall, despite the applicability of the aforemen-
tioned methods to identify advanced energy-theft attacks,
regression-based methods regularly demonstrate longer
detection times than other detection categories. In such cases,
regression techniques are principally employed in the first
stage of theft-detection methods and require additional pro-
cedures to reach a final decision during the detection process.
This in turn is a time-consuming task and limits the applica-
bility of such methods in a real-time energy trading scenario,
where the time required to detect theft activities is influential
in preventing any losses.
3) CLUSTERING-BASED DETECTION
A clustering-based theft detector utilising consumption pat-
terns was also proposed by Jokar et al. [90]. In order to
improve classification accuracy, the number of clusters in
the examined dataset was filtered through Silhouette plots
and subsequently clusters were hierarchically labelled across
various consumption profiles. The resulted outcomes of this
approach demonstrate that even with low measurement sam-
pling intervals, the algorithm is scalable and achieves a detec-
tion rate of 94%. However, the proposed technique required
the installation of transformer meters, which increased the
monetary cost of such systems.
An alternative approach based on genetic algorithms and
finite mixture modeling for composing clusters of consump-
tion in order to identify customer segmentation and potential
outliers was presented by Razavi et al. in [91]. In fact, the pro-
posed method outperforms a number of classification-based
approaches such as k-nearest neighbours (KNN), ANN and
SVM by 99.8% in the area under the curve for theft detection.
However, such a detection system cannot be applied in a real-
time scenario, since the results achieved indicate that there is
an increase in the relative to physical inspection.
An outlier-based detector of three modules was presented
by Peng et al. in [92]. The proposedmethod applied local out-
lier factor (LOF) and the KNN algorithm as the basis to detect
theft at the end-user infrastructure. Firstly, consumption pro-
files were analysed with k-means and subsequently outlier
candidates were selected based on the deviation of each con-
sumer from the relative cluster centers. Finally, the anomaly
ranking of the selected candidates was calculated using the
LOF algorithm. Although the proposed detector achieves
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reasonably high detection accuracy of 91.84%, it still fails
to detect linear theft, where an attacker manipulates the con-
sumption profile to reduce it at a constant rate.
Despite the fact that clustering-based methods can be
used in scenarios of scarcity, minimal or zero availability
of malicious intent, these methods will normally produce
an end result with a high false-positive rate. To construct
a clustering-based model, no assumptions of labelled data
from malicious and theft-free behaviours are made. As a
result, the detection model can identify any abnormal patterns
as malicious behaviours [93]. In general, abnormalities may
occur due to non-malicious activities (e.g., smart-meter mis-
configurations), leading to an increase of false-positive rates
resulted by clustering-based theft detection mechanisms.
4) COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS
Undoubtedly, malicious actors continue to target a diverse
set of vulnerabilities present over various system, network
and algorithmic components serving the (sub)infrastructures
composing a smart grid deployment. Hence, attackers intend
to launch energy theft attacks through a variety of tech-
niques that target the evasion from current detection schemes.
Evidently, data-driven methods for detecting energy theft
distilled by learning, profiling and detecting abnormalities are
considered as a means to adaptively engage with new attack
vectors.
In general, data-driven energy theft detection schemes
leverage three conceptual and data-driven procedures;
(i) data-processing and model-selection stages covering
aspects of data sanitisation and feature selection, (ii) model-
training procedure which varies across classification,
clustering and regression detectionmethods and (iii) decision-
making procedure which includes applying a model trained
on new data such as to pinpoint anomalies that could relate
with malicious activity.
Given the ‘‘ad-hoc’’ employment of most of the detection
methods presented herein over specific use cases, we argue
that there is no universal data-driven methodology covering
all aggregation levels in a given smart grid deployment.
In general, the aforementioned three levels, categorized into
energy generation, T&D, and end-user infrastructures have
different probabilities for the deployment of theft and differ-
ent vulnerabilities exploited bymalicious actors. Such factors
should be taken into consideration when amethod is designed
to detect energy-theft attacks.
However, the utilization of a hybrid data-driven model
has proven to be more robust than adopting a single model
in detecting attack vectors underpinning energy theft. Such
hybrid methods are considered to make combinatorial use of
two or more data-driven models. In such methods, the entire
theft detection method leverages the analytic process of each
candidate model to achieve a specific action. All achieved
actions are subsequently integrated into one detection system
in order to complement each other and mitigate the limita-
tions of the others.
Furthermore, the utilization of data from multiple and
diverse sources can create a more reliable method for
detecting energy-theft attacks over smart-grid infrastructures.
Detection methods utilizing a single data source are con-
strained to build a candidate model fitting specific data mea-
surements, thus its suitability is not generic. Moreover, the
candidate model is sensitive to the samples it was trained
with, which may potentially have been manipulated to falsify
the detection method to cope with new adversarial objec-
tives. However, by acquiring the data from various sources
which have less likelihood to be accessible to adversaries can
significantly increase the reliability and performance of the
detection method.
The adoption of data-driven methods that utilise multiple
and diverse data feeds would unavoidably invoke trade-offs
spanning across performance, privacy and computational
complexity. For instance, data-driven theft detection at the
end-user infrastructure method would require a privacy-
aware data processing and aggregation scheme. Hence,
in order to detect theft in DRES infrastructure, the detection
method should not rely on data that are not available to utility
providers such as EMS measurements. Such measurements
are usually maintained by the DRES owner and not accessible
to any third party. Thus, there could be some limitations in
terms of the granularity of the anomaly detection process
employed by the theft detection scheme. On the other hand,
energy theft-detection process in the T&D infrastructure
inherently requires the utilization of high volume of network
and system log measurements. Therefore, an anticipated high
computational cost would be implied and thus limit the real-
time capabilities of a given theft detection scheme.
V. PRESENT GAPS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite the various solutions proposed in terms of energy
theft detection, there exist various gaps and open issues thus
requiring further attention within future research directions.
Within this section, we highlight and discuss some of the chal-
lenges and we further summarize potential future research
directions. As depicted in in Fig. 7 we decompose the gaps
spectrum into (i) measurement-driven, (ii) machine learning
and (iii) security-related challenges.
A. MEASUREMENT-DRIVEN CHALLENGES
1) TESTBED SCENARIOS AND DATASETS
Diverse energy-related data sets, different network infras-
tructures, and multi-faceted energy theft-related attacks are
studied in most of the presented works as discussed in this
study. However, there is a notable lack of commonly available
(and applied) prototype implementation on realistic large-
scale testbed as well as datasets such as to enable extensive
experimental verification nor experimental reproducibility
tailored for energy theft detection [93]. Most testbeds and
their corresponding datasets are principally designed in an
ad-hoc fashion for specific projects limiting the generali-
sation of findings [95]. Therefore, we argue that it is of
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FIGURE 7. Present gaps in energy theft detection.
crucial importance to build benchmark testbeds and properly
designed platforms such as to test connections and security
features of a system and maintain alignment with the prag-
matic and rapidly emerging design requirements of current
and future smart grid deployments.
2) MEASUREMENTS & BIG DATA
Volume, velocity, and variety are the traditional traits and they
naturally challenge any analysis domain within the smart-
grid ecosystem [96]. Hence, the adequate comprehension and
optimisation of these diverse traits during data collection, pro-
cessing and analysis over particular smartgrid scenarios such
as energy theft detection is of vital importance. For instance,
there are 27 million consumers that consume domestic elec-
tricity in the UK alone. These consumers have more than
100 million data points that are collected either quarterly or
half-yearly. These points are used by the energy suppliers to
store, record and use in the billing system and identifying
abnormal conditions that could relate to specific energy theft-
related attacks. However, with smart metering, to collect the
data from these many data points, at a thirty-minute sam-
pling rate, will require a substantial amount of resources. For
example, at least 4500 to 9000 times more of the present data
size will be required to be processed by the energy suppliers,
and therefore this leads to a significant augmentation in data
size [97]. Thus, there is a strong requirement for efficiently
coupling the measurement requirements for granular energy
monitoring with optimised storage as well as data processing
solutions.
B. MACHINE LEARNING CHALLENGES
1) CLASS IMBALANCE
Class imbalance problem is a traditional problem existing
for supervised or semi-supervised learning having direct
implications on energy theft detection. In particular, this
problem occurs when one of the classes (in amulti-class prob-
lem) has significantly more number of samples than the other
classes, thus the training model is biased leading the testing
phase to classify events towards the majority class label [98].
Hence, in the case of learning for theft instances in which are
by far less than legitimate instances, the class imbalance prob-
lem would result on a classifier to incorrectly label malicious
instances to the majority of normal behaviour. It is there-
fore important to establish adequate ground truth datasets
with correct scaling factors through the training phase of
learning processes by assigning correct weight parameters to
malicious samples. Thus, addressing the limitations from the
class imbalance problem [99]. Nonetheless, the composition
of concrete ground truth labels for theft instances is also a
topic aligned with the needs of optimised feature engineering
and selection as we discuss next.
2) FEATURE ENGINEERING AND SELECTION
Feature engineering accompanied by efficient feature selec-
tion is a powerful foundation for addressing the afore-
mentioned class imbalance problem as well as tailoring
a learning procedure to identify energy theft instances.
Evidently, it is common in many energy theft detection
processes to operate over insufficient or incomplete fea-
ture vectors and experience class imbalance as well as
model over-fitting (i.e., learn the only specific pattern in a
given dataset), thus affecting significantly detection accu-
racy. Therefore, designing and engineering new features
can improve the performance of machine learning detection
methods [99], [100].
3) NON-MALICIOUS ABNORMAL ACTIVITIES
A classical problem within anomaly detection is the dis-
tinction of classes between anomalous events. Energy theft-
related attacks could relate to statistical abnormalities and
have similar properties as anomalous events that are caused
by legitimate intent (e.g., smart meter misconfiguration).
A great challenge is to compose adequate classification and
clustering schemes that are able to pinpoint the differences
between malicious and legitimate processes and further high-
light the specific properties entailed within an energy theft
incident. There can be many reasons that the ambiguities
in electrical node output patterns may occur. These can
happen owing to several altered causes such as new device
installation (for example, a new DRES) or changing in the
electricity usage habit of the residential end users [93].
This, in turn, increases the overall inspection cost [4] as
once the model classifies an energy theft attack, physical
inspection is essential for final verification and that is a
costly procedure [90]. It can, therefore, be argued that there
is a requirement for more research in the improvement of
the proposed detection methods in terms of reconsigning
the theft detection activities and reducing the false positive
alarms [99].
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4) ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
As already described, it is feasible for an adversary to manip-
ulate end-user data or game the algorithmic learning proce-
dure in a targeted manner. These particular types of attacks
are called adversarial machine learning attacks which are car-
ried out for the purpose of theft detection. For example, carry-
ing out an attack where input data is made to look like normal
electrical data, i.e., crafting an attack that seems normal to
the machine learning algorithm or changing the weights of
the trained ML model. These scenarios can maximize the
predicted loss or falsify trained models to new adversarial
objectives [23], [101], [102]. Moreover, handcrafted rule-
based attacks are more sophisticated (than automated attacks)
and proposes different challenges, and therefore a generalized
detectionmodel will not provide promising results [23]. Thus,
more studies are required to investigate the capabilities and
the limitations of existing machine learning detection algo-
rithms with respect to adversarial machine learning.
C. PRIVACY CHALLENGES
1) DATA BREACH
Most of the energy theft attack detection schemes utilize
(some of) the private information of consumers/prosumers,
such as smart meter readings and user load/generation pro-
files. While this information can help to detect the theft
attacks to a certain extent, it should still be kept in mind that
disclosing such private data may raise concerns about the
user’s safety and breach his/her privacy. These data breach
threats can occur in different stages of the theft detection
process, including data collection, transmission and storage.
Such sensitive breached information might be purchased by
interested third parties such as marketing companies which
can use this data to sell their products to possible customers.
Apart from this, if criminals get their hands on this sensi-
tive data, the daily routine of a household can be analyzed
from electricity usage/generation pattern to carry out crimes.
Therefore, detecting energy theft attacks while maintaining
privacy of information is a challenging task, but there is a
notable lacking of intelligent privacy-preserving detection
schemes in the works of the energy theft [103].
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
2) MEASUREMENT-DRIVEN SOLUTIONS
a: TESTBED SIMULATION, EMULATION AND HARDWARE
Future works should consider the measurement-driven chal-
lenges that affect energy theft detection frameworks. The
energy theft activities should be ratified by experimental
environments and for this to happen, there is a strong need to
include testbed software simulation, emulation and hardware
for carrying out energy theft analysis. For instance, a cloud-
based environment can be created to store smart grid data
which can be used in these testbeds to conduct energy theft
analysis [30]. With simulation software and emulation hard-
ware, a quick verification of new concepts can be achieved
efficiently which can then be easily transferred to power
system industry and for more extensive public use. More-
over, these testbeds create interesting educational platforms
to understudies which would spur the research interests to
conduct multi-user experimental facilities for several smart
grid applications [95].
b: BIG DATA SCHEMES
To collect, store, and process monitoring data various diverse
data sources in smart grid results to the big data challenges
as discussed earlier. To cater to these challenges the two
important future directions include the creation on big data
analysis platforms and reducing the complexity of such data.
For the former, cloud computing technology has been used
to create big data platforms by the many industries since
this technology is scalable, self-organizing, and adaptive.
Therefore, platforms such as Hadoop, Cassandra, and Hive
in conjunction with cloud computing can be used by utility
providers for smart grid big data analysis [104]. For the
latter (to reduce the data complexity), different techniques
such as dimensionality reduction, distributed optimization
algorithms, and active learning can be useful to analyze
big data efficiently [105]. Different studies reported that the
computational process of the summarized and produced data
rather than the original data stream can result in an acceptable
relative error [106]. Therefore, these dimensionality reduc-
tion techniques are useful for reducing the communication
cost, computing complexity, and storage resource utilization
for smart grid big data analysis [107].
3) MACHINE LEARNING SOLUTIONS
a: CLASS IMBALANCE
Class imbalances happen when there are less samples in
one of the target classes for machine learning algorithms
or a close similarity in the number of samples in consid-
ered classes. To enhance the learning results associated with
imbalanced data classes (and improve on their bias), three
primary methods can be utilized: data-level, algorithm-level
and hybrid techniques [108]. In the data-level techniques, the
concentration is on the modification of training set to allow
more balanced distributions for oversampling (more minority
groups’ samples) and undersampling (fewer majority groups’
samples). The algorithm-level techniques modify the learners
that already exist to eliminate their bias for majority groups.
However, good insight is required into the modified learning
algorithm and real discovery of reason for skewed mining
distributions. Some popular algorithmic techniques include
cost-sensitive approach (to insert different penalties for every
group of samples) and one-class learning (concentrating on
the specific target groups). The hybrid techniques use the
combination of methods as mentioned above, by reducing
their weaknesses and making use of their strengths [108].
b: FEATURE ENGINEERING AND SELECTION SCHEMES
We argue that future research directions could place stronger
focus on particularly exploring algorithmic and system-wide
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principles to facilitate automated feature engineering and
selection methods. The feature engineering process can
extend the original detectionmodel’s feature vector by adding
new features that are calculated based on other input features.
These engineered features may be the differences, averages,
or other statistical transformations of the original feature
vector, helping in better understanding of the interactions
amongst these features. This process is similar to the statis-
tical transformations performed by human analysts for con-
structing an engineered feature formulas. The task of feature
engineering and selection is mainly a time-consuming task
and each model type will respond in different manner to
different engineered feature types [109]. However, in general,
the selected and engineered featured would help in achieving
the maximum probability of success for the ML algorithms
to detect energy theft [110]. Typically for feature engineering
and selection, many methods can be used such as mathemat-
ical functions, deep feature synthesis components, expansion
reduction, evolution-centric, multi layer neural networks and
hyper parameter optimization [109], [111].
c: FALSE POSITIVE RATE-REDUCTION SCHEMES
A meta-learning scheme can be helpful to reduce the false
positive rates resulting from non-malicious activities in the
process of energy-theft attack detection. Meta-learning can
be defined as a learning process involving the collection of
knowledge from past experience in order to use it in future
learning [112]. Meta-learning is required by the theft-attack
detection system to combine various classifiers (by taking
note of their behaviours) and adopting an integration rule
to reduce false positives. In the literature, the main meta-
learning techniques include stacking, bagging, voting and
boosting. In the voting approach, each classifier has one vote,
and the classification that has the highest votes determines
the final prediction. In stacking learning, the process adopts
a layered architecture wherein each layer has one or more
classification techniques. A layer’s projection is applied to
extend the original vector of the feature with the closest
instance. The bagging approach creates a combination of
classifiers through the manipulation of training samples in
a base classifier. It selects one base classifier and invokes it
many times using several training samples. Boosting, in con-
trast to bagging learning, generates various basic classifiers
through a procedure in which examples of data sets receive
new weights in sequence [113].
d: ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING SCHEMES
With respect to adversarial machine learning, a binary
classifier-based intrusion detection system trained on avail-
able device behaviour logs is imperative [23]. This system
can attempt to tag approaching instances as either mali-
cious or benign, using features which are generated in real-
time from streams of energy data. Through gradual training
instances expansion and feature generation refinement, this
system can produce a confidence score that can be utilized to
set recall/precision. This will allow having low maintenance
overheads and fewer false alerts as compared to a manual sys-
tem. The underlying intrusion detection system can employ
a broader range of features including outgoing data from
the control algorithm [23]. As also discussed in [23], [24]
malicious behaviours can be detected using other associated
features such as network properties (e.g. packet size, packet
arrival time) and communication security (e.g. certificate
fingerprints, negotiated cyber suite).
4) PRIVACY PRESERVING SCHEMES
Privacy-preserving schemes can be used in twoways to detect
energy theft attacks; one, focusing on protecting the identities
of users, and the other, emphasising protecting the data of
users [114]. For the first aspect, pseudonym, anonymization,
and virtual ring have been used. Pseudonym is considered to
be a common user identity protection approach. The registra-
tion process for a pseudonym often involves many data pro-
tection methods, such as ring signature and zero-knowledge
proof [114]. Anonymizing smart-grid data is one of the
methods approved by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology [115]. The main goal of anonymization is to
enable smart grids’ nodes to communicate in an anonymous
manner with various smart-grid service providers by using
different pseudonyms. Another common method for user-
identity preservation is a virtual ring, where a ring signature
is used to validate the identity of users, without knowing
their actual identity, by a control centre [116]. On the other
hand, for the second aspect, emphasising protecting users’
data, many methods can be used, such as data aggregation
or authentication methods. Data aggregation is a well-known
scheme which is used to protect the data of smart-grid users.
It generally includes data obfuscation algorithms and homo-
morphic encryption [103], [114]. Authentication methods are
efficient countermeasures for privacy-related attacks and are
usually based on key public infrastructure [117].
VII. CONCLUSION
Smart power grids aim towards resilient, reliable and sus-
tainable operation of legacy power systems and also the
integration of smart business models for the optimised use
of energy by consumers. Nonetheless, their complex sys-
tem architecture in which diverse and heterogeneous infras-
tructures interconnect, facilitates the basis for a number
of attacks that enable energy theft. Energy theft attacks
affect critical grid processes and facilitate financial gain for
malicious actors. To present the overall overview of such
actors and their energy theft activities, we conduct a through
study of data-driven energy theft attack and detection tech-
niques in this paper for smart grid systems. In this regard,
we firstly present the smart grid components in the energy
supply chain with a focus on their data communication along
with the pillars to access grid effectiveness. The impact of
energy theft in the smart grid is then discussed by critically
assessing how energy theft can be formulated by manipu-
lating demand, supply, and generation data. The data-driven
energy theft attack examples are then discussed along with
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their enabling activities. Furthermore, we categorize exten-
sive studies addressing the data-driven aspect of energy theft
detection and summarizing the experimental approaches for
such studies. Lastly, we highlight various open issues and
challenges still persisting in the area of energy theft detection.
We summarise and further indicate future research directions
for data-driven energy theft.
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